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It has become fashionable to speak of sub-Saharan Africa as being 1n 
the grip of an economic crisis. A substantial volume of writing and a multi­
faceted, often heated, debate has built up over 1981-83 about causes of and 
cures for that crisis.
However, much of the debate, and of the writing, operates at a very 
high level of generalisation and at some considerable remove from concrete, 
country experiences. In the first place they seek to generalise about sub- 
Saharan Africa as a whole, an approach which has a high cost 1n submerging^
differences. Even more seriously they often start from normative pos1t1orjsJ
—  e.g. pro-private enterprise or ant1-devaluat1on -- and use empirical
selectively 1n ways more likely to confirm the Initial supposition than tcF 
shed light on Its strengths and weaknesses. This 1s a particularly easy 
weakness Into which to fall because 1n sub-Saharan Africa much of the data 1s j 
extremely bad. For example variations between +2 per cent and +4 j?fe*r cent orí 
even 4 per cent and +2 per cent for estimates of agricultural growth-'in the 
same country over the same period are not unknown. Nor, 1n such {Tuses, 1s 1t i 
an easy matter to decide which series 1s "least bad". fJL
As a result, there have tended to be dialogues of tjie deaf d a v  
excessive concentration on specific themes wrenched out of the overall
economic context. The selection of topics sometimes seems to relate to ease, 
of discussion in general terms as much as to intrinsic merit. Prices are 
important and easy to analyse at a high level of generality. Transport and 
storage bottlenecks and gaps are just as Important b u t ^ l t t l e  can be sa.d 
except 1n -concrete contexts. Therefore, general studies tend to 11st them and 
pass on, but to analyse and discuss prices 1n general terms at great length.
Subsequent case studies at country level also often concentrate on macro-
monetary Issues and give only limited attention to micro and sectoral "real" 
constraints or obstacles. This process has polarised positions and, 1n doing 
so, has reduced both the growth of factual knowledge and the ability to devise
operational programmes, either domestically or 1n conjunction with such ex­
ternal bodies as the World Bank and IMF.
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This overview of the current and recent sub-Saharan economic scene
makes no claim to def1n 111 veness, to a detailed analytical exposition or to
providing Its own empirical justification. What 1t does attempt to do Is to 
set out a number of the key questions about sub-Saharan African economies and 
their performance and to do so 1n a non-polemic and readily comprehensible 
way. Within this approach the complexity and Interrelationships of Issues 
and policies are stressed, as 1s the very substantial diversity of experience 
among sub-Saharan economies.
The picture which emerges 1s a good deal more complex than the hard­
line advocates and opponents of particular strategies and policies appear to 
assume. While both the present situation and short term prospects are -- with 
a handful of exceptions -- far from bright, the available data does not sup­
port either the assertion that the 1970s were a decade of unrelieved failure 
or a conviction that the economic future of Africa -- and more Important, of 
Africans -- 1s veering unrestralnably and Irrevocably towards disintegration. 
If the review of Issues and of data which follows helps provide a foundation 
for research on elucidating the contextual and structural weaknesses under­
lying sub-Saharan Africa's unusally poor economic performance over 1980-84, 1t
will have served Its primary purpose. If such a review can also serve to
clarify and assist that dialogue, the purpose of which 1s to procure action to 
correct such weaknesses, so much the better.
Did all sub-Saharan African economies have a bad record throughout the 1970s?
No. The decade can pretty clearly be divided Into two periods. Over 
1970-75, sub-Saharan Africa as a region had growth rates below the LDC 
average. Over 1976-79 the sub-Saharan annual average (at about £ per cent) 
was of the same magnitude as the LDC average. Over the decade as a whole, 
according to data available from UNCTAD, the sub-Saharan average was below the 
LDC average, but that had also been true of the 1960s. In the 1980s 
sub-Saharan Africa -- like Latin America -- has had very low or negative 
growth.
Within sub-Saharan Africa results varied widely. There were countries 
of chronically poor economic performance, e.g. Ghana, Sierra Leone, .'dan, 
Madagascar, Zaire. Other countries stagnated, e.g. Senegal, Benin, Burkina 
Faso. C 1v11 war, external Intervention and domestic strife lowered growth 
rates (or caused absolute declines) 1n Uganda, Chad, Rhodesia (as 1t was 
then), Angola, Mozambique, Central African Republic. Very poor mineral prices 
from 1975 onwards hit several economies very hard, notably those of Mauritania 
and Zambia. However, many countries maintained over most of the decade annual 
growth rates of the order of 5 per cent or above, e.g. Botswana, Cameroon, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania.
The main cause of economic success cannot be uniformly ascribed either 
to the availability of resources, or to the chosen economic strategy. 
Policies on such Issues as distribution, rural/urban balance, the role of 
state enterprise, etc. varied widely. However, all the successes sought to 
achieve or to maintain positive above-the-11ne budgetary balances and -- with 
less uniformity of results —  to avoid severely overvalued exchange rates.
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Why have results, at least since 1979, been almost uniformly bad? Have
sub-Saharan governments grossly mishandled their responses to recession?
Of all regions, sub-Saharan Africa has been hit hardest by the 1979-83 
recession. Deterioration 1n terms of trade of the order of 33 per cent to 
50 per cent between 1976 and 1982 has been common. A majority of countries 
have also suffered from severe droughts.
Many of those conditions prevailed 1n 1973-74 as well. What was
notable then was the speed and relative success of a large number of adjust­
ment programmes leading to good performances between 1976 and 1979.
The experience between 1979 and 1983 has been very different for a 
number of reasons. First, governments believed 1979-80 would have an Impact
on the global economy like 1973-74 -- a sharp shock, a short slump and a rapid 
recovery (they read the OECD, IMF, IBRD studies of the day which predicted 
exactly that, and prepared their responses accordingly). In the event this
was unwise -- there was no global recovery until 1983 and Its Impact has still
barely affected the real price of most sub-Saharan exports.
Second, over 1979-83 there was no parallel to the 011 Facility and 
other fairly easy access to soft credit as had been the case 1n 1973-74. This 
led many countries Into unwise use of supplier credits and of commercial bank 
loans to bridge what they expected to be a short slump. When the slump con­
tinued and Interest rates (both nominal and real) rose sharply, their external 
debt service positions became unmangeable. In over half the cases, substan­
tial commercial payments arrears built up despite sharp cuts 1n real Import
volume (1n many cases 25 per cent or more).
Third, the unexpectedly long duration of the slump, and cuts 1n Imports 
forced by limited credit availability combined with rising debt service costs, 
eroded governments' revenue bases. Despite real cuts on spending under most, 
heads, recurrent budget deficits became chronic even 1n states like Malawi and' 
Tanzania which had previously had above-the-11ne surpluses. These deficits 
Interacted with the terms of trade deterioration to produce far more signifi­
cant currency overvaluations than had been experienced previously. ¿
Why had public sector capacity to act declined so sharply?
The simple answer 1s lack of resources. For example 1n 7afhb1a rural
health services usually lack fuel and spares for vehicles, drugs and food for
patients, equipment and kerosene for clinics. Extension services 1n several j 
countries cannot sensibly advise use of fertilizer. Insecticides, Implemer^rs 
or Improved seed because none of these 1s available.
In some countries —  notably but not exclusively the poorer Francophone 
ones -- c 1 v 11 servants and municipal employees are commonly paid up to three 
months 1n arrears. Nearly everywhere attempts to regain budgetary balance
have reduced the purchasing power of government employees' pay draconlcally:
for example, 1n Uganda a clerk or labourer's monthly pay as of early 1984 
would barely buy one week's staple food for his family; 1n Zaire a 
secretary's salary would just about cover the cost of going to and from work.
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»In many countries, as the result of two decades of Intensive training 
backed by substantial external support, competent personnel -- especially 1n 
health and education -- are available. Unfortunately lack of adequate govern­
ment revenue or Import capacity means that drugs, textbooks, kerosene for 
fridges, desks and chairs, paper and pencils, beds and medical equipment, 
vehicles and fuel cannot be provided 1n adequate quantities for the personnel 
to function properly (for example, recently, only an emergency foreign grant 
averted the total absence of drugs 1n the main Swaziland hospital at Mbabane).
Have sub-Saharan African states overexpanded their public sectors?
Sometimes but not always. On average sub-Saharan government budgets
—  with the exception of social security and related transfer payments -- are 
about the same percent of GDP as 1n other areas of the world. Nor, with one 
exception, 1s there a marked average difference 1n their make-up by type of 
spending. Social security and related transfer payments are the lowest of any 
region; e.g. 1n Tanzania government pensions, national provident fund and 
malzemeal subsidies -- the main social security and related transfer payment 
Items —  were under 3 per cent of GDP and, with the 1984 subsidy abolition,
are now lower.
Sub-Saharan public enterprise Investments vary widely 1n operating 
efficiency and profitability. Few generalisations can be made safely even 
within countries. Public enterprises dealing with food procurement and 
distribution (1n most cases, the lineal descendants of colonial boards) are 
relatively high cost and limited 1n their ability to distribute throughout the 
country. But these fallings also characterise most private and co-operative 
enterprises dealing with food production and distribution.
In two senses the public sector 1s overextended. First, the present
eroded revenue base does not allow full operation of what capacity exists. In 
cases such as health, education, water, and transport where the need 1s 
clearly for more, not less, services for economic as well as humane reasons, 
the cure lies primarily 1n restoring the revenue base. For some states not 
facing significant external threats (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria), some cutbacks ii 
defence spending may well be appropriate. Similarly 1n some states the pro­
portion of expenditure on administrative services appears unduly large.
Second, given the limited financial and personnel resources, greater
selectivity 1n determining what to do would seem necessary. In most cases the 
actual choice 1s not between whether a service 1s provided publicly or 
privately; 1t 1s between whether 1t 1s provided publicly or not at all. In 
present circumstances, a more limited range of functions, carried out better, 
would usually be desirable.
In respect of public enterprises the choices are somewhat more com­
plex. For a number of sectors —  e.g. rail transport, electricity generation, 
airlines, harbours -- there 1s neither a realistic private sector alternative 
nor an option to close down. In others the choice 1s effectively between 
public sector African (or mixed African/foreign) and foreign private enter­
prise. Present constraints do Imply that where African private (or co­
operative) enterprises can do the job —  e.g. small-scale Industry, retail 
trade, most road transport —  public sector enterprise participation needs 
special, and convincing, justification. Experience elsewhere (notably 1n
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Brazil and South Korea) suggests that detailed, selective state Intervention 
at the product and enterprise level Is Important to achieving overall economic 
and export growth. Credit and Import allocations are, 1t appears, partlcu- [ 
larly critical. Whether such Interventions work more efficiently with a sub- j 
stantlal public sector presence 1n the financial and external trade fields 1s 
open to debate. The appropriate answer 1s likely to vary from state to state, 
and over time, and to be related as much to the number of qualified, ex­
perienced citizen personnel available as to Ideological choices.
How much of sub-Saharan Africa's failure to respond effectively flows from bad
economic management?
This varies widely from country to country. Just as the 1970s economic 
performance record was very uneven, so also was the quality of economic 
management. In every country some policy mistakes, and a greater number of 
weaknesses 1n Implementation and management, can be cited. However, 1t 1s not 
convincing to argue that economic management suddenly became worse as of 1979.
What clearly did happen was that economic management became less able 
to produce the desired results. That, however, was true 1n all regions -- not 
excluding OECD -- over 1979-82. The failure was more pronounced 1n sub- 
Saharan Africa because the external shocks were greater both relative to the 
physical and financial capacity to respond and to the ability of economic 
management to tackle harder problems. Diversion of attention to crisis con­
tainment, however necessary, saps annual programming and strategic planning 
capacity.
Failure to achieve results —  for whatever reasons —  1s bad for 
morale. When repeated failures accumulate over several years, Individual and 
Institutional managerial capacities are eroded. That process has occurred J 
already 1n several states which performed badly 1n the 1970s; there Is a real 
danger that 1t will occur 1n several more 1f the problems which have over- ? 
whelmed many sub-Saharan countries 1n the past five years remain unresolved.
Have Francophone countries done better economically?
Probably not. If one pairs roughly comparable Francophone and Anglo­
phone economies and looks at a range of Indicators, for example, past, eod
present growth rates, external balance, external debt burden and adequacy of 
public services, 1t 1s possible to reach an opposite conclusion. Much depends 
on which Indicators of economic performance are chosen.
Botswana has a better record than Gabon. Cameroon has performed better 
than Nigeria. Kenya has done somewhat better than the Ivory Coast (especially
taking Into account the latter's appalling external debt position). While
both Sierra Leone and Guinea have been consistently unsuccessful economically, 
the Guinean record 1s worse. Senegal -- despite near stagnation for most of 
two decades —  has done less badly than Ghana. Malawi has outperformed Mall 
by a substantial margin and Tanzania has a much better record than the
Malagasy Republic.
What 1s evident 1s that the majority of Francophone African states have 
usually avoided overt recurrent budget deficits, open detailed quantitative
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tImport controls and -- less markedly —  sustained high rates of Inflation. 
The reason for this —  and their typically higher external debt services 
burden —  lies 1n the monetary and exchange rate system which members of the 
franc zone operate.
What 1s special about the Francophone West African, Central African, and 
Malagasy Central Banks?
These are operated for the two groups of states, as well as -- less 
rigidly —  for Madagascar, on the U n e s  of the last phase of the British
Colonial Currency Boards. They have strict limits on fiduciary Issues and are
basically French-run 1n terms of policy. Change of currency parities against 
the French franc (or each other) 1s only permitted exceptionally.
Nor 1s exchange control against France allowed. The French leverage 1s 
exerted partly through the provision of French personnel, but even more 
through the provision of French Treasury Funds to cover approved state and
external balance deficits.
This framework does prevent access to the printing press for the
finance of government deficits; but 1t also prevents devaluation as a cure
for overvaluation and ties real exchange rate changes to those of France,
which 1s not very logical given their differences 1n economic structures. As 
a result 1t leads to smaller government spending (or to non-payment of bills 
Including wages and salaries) and to somewhat greater price stability. It has 
also led to far greater use of short- and medium-term external commercial 
credit (for the Ivory Coast £3 500 million falls due over 1984-88) and to
heavier taxation of agricultural exports -- neither of which features can be
considered evidence of a satisfactory strategy on broader economic grounds.
Does the greater number of middle-level Europeans and old colonial hands 
benefit Francophone African states?
Yes and no. The greater number of mechanics, secondary school 
teachers, hairdressers and foremen are the counterpart to less training 
-- especially less technical and vocational training. That seems to be a 
weakness of Francophone Africa and of France's form of development co­
operation, which 1s 1n contrast to Commonwealth Africa's relative success in 
training and the strong co-operation 1t has received from the United Kingdom.
Commonwealth African governments may at times have been too eager to 
localise jobs, but on balance 1t 1s doubtful that the quality of their basic 
Une officers 1s now lower than that of Francophone states with their larger 
numbers of former colonial c1v11 servants. Part of the difference 1s termino­
logical. Anglophone states use more specialist consultants and technical as­
sistance personnel from a variety of sources and tend to call such people 
advisors even when they are doing standard c1v11 service work.
A real difference does exist 1n respect to the staffing of Treasuries 
and Central Banks. But the effect upon policy and administration appears to 
be as much the result of maintaining fixed Franc zone parities, to the absence 
of exchange control, to the limitation of fiduciary Issues, and to the
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#operation of the French Treasury special account as to the actual nationality 
of the personnel employed.
Do many sub-Saharan economies have serious external debt problems, or 1s 1t 
only a handful such as Zaire. Sudan. Nigeria. Ivory Coast?
Most sub-Saharan African economies have very severe external debt and 
debt service problems. Only Botswana and Cameroon can be said unambiguously 
to combine viable medium-term Import capacity, sound external balance para­
meters, and comfortable debt service ratios. Gabon may soon reach that 
position, but only after five years of Internal recession to overcome Its 
external debt crisis.
Zaire, the Sudan, Nigeria and now the Ivory Coast are the best known 
cases because they are absolutely the largest. Smaller countries whose debt- 
servldng costs now require 25-50 per cent of export earnings are equally
weighed down, but the absolute size of their debt 1s not large enough to at­
tract the attention of the International financial community.
The total external debts of sub-Saharan African countries Include very 
high proportions of very short-term credits (I.e. under one year), commercial 
arrears and IMF drawings, which do not figure 1n the World Bank's debt statis­
tics but do need to be serviced. Taking these Into account, the typical
African economy has a debt service ratio of 35-40 per cent of export earn­
ings. Even countries like Zimbabwe, which had limited debt 1n 1980 and 
borrowed only for priority capital projects, and which sought to maximize the 
use of soft and long-term finance, have debt service ratios which are already 
over 30 per cent and likely to rise.
How much would rescheduling help?
Rescheduling by Itself will not help much 1n the more acute cases —  at 1 
least not unless the period and terms are to be significantly different from 
current London and Paris Club models.
To be able to service debt African countries must Increase exports. To 
do so they need to avoid economic collapse and to Invest 1n the production of 
exportable goods and 1n the necessary supporting Infrastructure. This means 
more Imports for specific Investments, more Imports to keep the economies 
going, and more Imports to maintain or rehabilitate the existing capital
stock. Import cuts 1n many economies are now starving the export sector of
materials and spare parts, and debilitating processing and transport capacity.
Two or three year roll-forward debt rescheduling exercises cannot pro­
vide all of the foreign exchange needed to rehabilitate or expand exports to 
the extent necessary to enable the debt eventually to be re-pa1d. Both new 
lending (public and/or private) and Interim balance of payments support fund­
ing are needed too. More useful than repetitive one or two year capital pay­
ment reschedulings would be a number of packages combining five to eight year 
capital repayment deferral with aid and selective new lending.
In some cases, such as Zaire, the Sudan and, counting arrears, Tanzania
and Zambia, 1t 1s clear that the full amount lent can never be recovered. An
20
analogy to the reconstruction of company debt should apply here. It would be 
better to write off some of the debt (or to achieve the same result by turning 
1t Into longer-term, low Interest obligations) 1n order to allow a practicable 
programme for servicing the rest.
Isn't 1t vital for sub-Saharan economies to export more?
Yes. Many are now covering only 50 to 60 per cent of their Imports 
from export earnings. Worse, this 1s being achieved at Import levels which 
have been cut so much that these economies, Including their export sectors, 
cannot function properly. The need to raise export earnings could not be 
clearer.
In some, but by no means all cases, the export sectors are large 
relative to GDP and are leading sectors which create growth 1n demand for 
others —  for example 1n Botswana. What 1s general 1s that sub-Saharan 
African economies (and other low Income economies, excluding India and China) 
are highly sensitive to fluctuations 1n real levels of Imports. When these 
are stagnant or cut, so too 1s domestic production. Ironically this 1s most 
true when Imports are largely directed Into domestic production (not final 
consumption), are a relatively low proportion of output value at factor cost, 
but are vital to production. Forced cutbacks 1n such Imports have a negative 
multiplier effect on GDP. For example, 1n Tanzania the ratio of operating
Inputs and spares to ex factory value of manufacturing 1s -- on average  
between 20 and 25 per cent. Therefore a $1 cut 1n the real value of such 
Imports causes a $3 to $4 constant price loss of GDP, distributed among manu­
facturing and sectors selling domestic Inputs to 1t. The most pressing and 
most general reason why sub-Saharan economies must raise export earnings 1s, 
therefore, to raise real Import capacity to sustain, to restore, and to expand 
domestic production, especially domestic production for domestic use.
Identifying what 1s to be done requires looking at the causes of de­
clines 1n the real earned Import and debt service capacity provided by ex­
ports. Part of the problem 1s the fall 1n the real prices of many exports.
This has both reduced earnings on present volumes and acted as a disincentive 
to expansion. But sub-Saharan economies can do little about this on their 
own, and the OECD recovery has not yet caused much Improvement -- especially 
1n mineral prices.
Therefore, either the volume of present exports must be sustained,
restored, raised, or new ones developed. But which exports? To that question 
there are no easy, general answers -- except wrong ones. If all sub-Saharan 
economies were to raise coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco, sugar and cotton exports 
5 to 8 per cent a year, the price elasticities and their combined share of
world trade 1n these products are such that they would earn less, not more, 
foreign exchange. Sub-Saharan Africa 1s not, 1n general, a low labour cost 
area. Its nominal wages are often above those of South Asia but Its labour
productivity 1s not. Very few countries can mount labour-intensive export 
zone type programmes with any prospect of success.
Some specific answers can be given: Ghana needs to rehabilitate cocoa,
Uganda tea, the Sudan cotton and Senegal groundnuts. Zimbabwe should
rehabilitate and expand ferrochrome and steel production. New natural
resource-based products with reasonable market prospects, such as ammonia/urea
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1n Tanzania, should receive priority attention. But these approaches need to 
be worked out on a case by case basis. They require both time and finance to 
Implement. All they could provide would be a start to the rebuilding of
current account positions. Additional new exports need to be Identified and
developed on a pragmatic country by country basis -- and on a substantial
scale. Their urgency 1s reinforced by the fact that for their Initial five to 
eight years of operation, servicing the external debt Incurred to create them 
will severely limit their contribution to foreign exchange availability for
augmenting general Import capacity.
Why 1s sub-Saharan agriculture performing so badly?
Several reasons. A very Important reason -- especially for export 
crops —  1s price. Overvalued currencies and falling real International 
prices discourage output. Grain production which competes with Imports, where 
these are not restricted by various means, can also suffer (but such cases are 
now 1n a distinct minority). For food crops more generally, evidence suggests 
that price may not usually be the main problem. Food prices have risen faster 
than either wages or the cost of living 1n most African economies since 1979 
(where this 1s not the position 1n respect of official prices, peasants often 
sell on parallel markets and so do benefit from higher prices).
A second reason 1s the general economic situation. Agricultural Inputs 
—  even hoes —  are 1n scarce supply because of decreased Import capacity. 
The general economic situation 1s also causing processing and transport capa­
city to break down and has the effect of depriving food producers of the
domestic manufactures and other goods that would serve as an Incentive for 
them to bring their produce to the market.
A third reason 1s the lack of basic health, water and education 1n many
rural areas. This provides a very strong disincentive to staying on the
farm. The more ambitious leave for the urban areas, where such services are
better. Of those who stay, 1t may be observed that peasants who are often 111 
or Illiterate or both and who —  especially women and girls —  often have to 
spend much of their time walking many miles to get wood and water, are not 
likely to be very productive.
A fourth reason 1s the overemphasis on large mechanised farms, and on 
large-scale centrally organised Irrigation schemes —  an overemphasis still 
promoted by many external bodies. Mechanised agriculture 1n Africa —  at 
least for staple food production —  requires skilled management, fuel, and 
capital and 1s therefore Import Intensive. If often yields a poor return on 
capital employed even when (as 1n Zimbabwe) 1t 1s technically efficient. The 
same 1s usually true of large-scale, centrally run Irrigation schemes -- as 1n 
Senegal, Mall and northern Nigeria (the Sudan and Kenya are partial ex­
ceptions). These divert government expertise, personnel and funds away from 
addressing the central problems of peasant agriculture.
A fifth cause 1s changes 1n residential and occupational structure. In 
1960 about 80 per cent of households were peasant producers; 1n 1980 about 
65 per cent were. Taking Into account population growth, this would have 
required a 50 per cent Increase 1n food production per peasant household 1n 
order to maintain output per capita.
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Finally —  1n contrast to South and Southeast Asia -- sub-Saharan 
Africa has benefltted very little from agricultural research and technology 
which has been development-tested 1n the field for economic viability to 
growers and for peasant usability. Extension services are weak and peasants 
are cautious 1n adopting Innovations (rightly so, as their U v e s  are at stake 
and much past advice has been wrong). But the basic problem 1s a lack of 
tested knowledge on how output can be raised within specific ecological, 
labour, Input and capital constraints, and a failure to ascertain whether the 
grower's net Income benefit from that Increase would be enough to justify his 
accepting the extra risk and putting 1n the extra effort required. More at­
tention from the International crops research Institutes (especially ICRISAT), 
more co-ordinated regional work (as 1n SADCC on sorghum, millet and grain
legumes), and more carefully planned programmes are needed, especially for 
food crops. This 1s an area 1n which external Initiatives and support are
both necessary and likely to be welcomed. Without additional knowledge, ex­
tension, and related Inputs, 1t 1s hard to see how total output per peasant 
household can rise significantly on a sustained basis, especially bearing 1n
mind that Increasing population 1s shortening the fallow periods 1n tra­
ditional land-use rotation systems and forcing Increasing use of sub-marq1nal 
land.
Do not sub-Saharan economies urgently need “to get the prices right"?
Certainly. Present exchange rates (foreign exchange prices), grower 
prices, and price controls are often unrealistic and counter-productive. But, 
given the prevailing situations, price corrections often can be made only 1n 
conjunction with other measures.
If prevailing staple grain prices are only half what growers need to
break even, they need to be changed. But such prices cannot be adjusted over­
night with no other action. If they are there will be reactions by workers 
(whether riots, strikes or absenteeism), Imperilling both public order and
production. Alternatively there will need to be compensating —  or partially 
compensating —  wage Increases and/or additional food supplies to reduce 
"parallel market" grain prices.
If devaluation 1s not accompanied by external finance to permit In­
creased Imports to restore local production (e.g. of simple manufactured 
goods), and the processing and transport of exports, 1t will usually simply
set off new Inflationary spirals which rapidly cancel out the devaluation's
Initial price correction. Because IMF resources and quotas do not permit
drawings large enough to meet these Import requirements, most IMF programmes 
must be accompanied by World Bank and bilateral finance packages 1f they are 
to succeed.
At Issue are not simply relative price changes: real wages 1n many
African states have fallen 50 per cent since 1979 and, except for the Franco­
phone states (who have recently floated down with the franc), most have de­
valued massively 1n nominal -- and 1n some cases real -- terms. Questions of
phasing, and of the need to take supply-increasing steps parallel with price 
corrections, are also Important. As the World Bank pointed out 1n Its 1982 
World Development Report, and even more forcefully 1n Its 1984 submission to
the Development Committee, additional resources are necessary not simply to
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make price corrections compatible with political stability, but even to allow 
them the chance of having any lasting economic effect.
What about Investment?
Further Investment 1s urgent, but not primarily 1n new capacity. Pat­
terns of Investment need to be changed every bit as much as relative prices.
Key elements of present productive capacity and Infrastructure through­
out sub-Saharan Africa are deteriorating for lack of maintenance. Many pro­
duction and transport units have deteriorated so extensively that they require 
major rehabilitation. This should have top priority 1n gross Investment. 
Investment 1n new capacity will often make no addition to output; 1t may 
simply Increase the general level of capacity under-ut111satlon.
This 1s partly the responsibility of aid and credit agencies. It 1s 
much easier to secure funding for a new highway than for rehabilitation of an 
endangered one; 1t 1s even more difficult to get finance for the equipment 
and training of maintenance units.
Selective new Investments to raise production possibilities 1n respect 
of exports, and substitutes for Imports (especially food and energy), are 
needed. But 1n general much more attention (and external support) needs to go 
to maintenance, rehabilitation and the fuller use of existing capital stock.
Shouldn't sub-Saharan economies be practising austerity?
Most are. Taking Into account population growth and terms of trade 
losses, Zambia's per capita use of resources has fallen by nearly 50 per cent 
since 1975. Total constant price expenditure on public services 1n Tanzania 
(excluding debt service) has been reduced each year since 1979-80 —  with a 
total fall of the order of 20 per cent. Real c 1v11 service wages and salaries 
are down 20 per cent or more since 1979 1n a majority of African states and
50 per cent or more 1n a significant number. Import volume cuts are fre­
quently of the same order of magnitude.
As the IMF has said with regard to the Import cuts, this type of whole­
sale austerity 1s becoming counter-productive. At the International level 1t 
1s both a drag on the recovery of world trade and —  because 1t 1s eroding 
exports and making debt service burdens look ever more unbearable —  raises 
risks of deliberate defaults or, more probably, of defaults through sheer 
Inability to pay. Nationally 1t 1s eroding both Incentives to work hard (by 
peasants, wage earners, c1v11 servants and managers alike) and the capacity to 
provide minimum critical services (e.g. power, water, education, health, agri­
cultural extension).
What austerity by Itself has not been able to achieve 1s the freeing of
sufficient resources either to restore external balance or to end recurrent
budget deficits. In many countries there 1s an acute danger that further cuts 
will merely have the effect of diminishing exports and government revenue and 
Increasing Inflation yet further.
Continued austerity -- tempered once real output per capita, government
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revenue and exports begin to recover -- 1s critical. But 1t will only work 1f 
more foreign exchange to restore production and government revenue 1s also 
available. In some cases this may largely require altering the balance of ex­
ternal financial flows toward maintenance, rehabilitation and operating In­
puts. In others —  as with the rehabilitation programmes of major commercial 
enterprises —  more external grants and credits will be required 1f the 
austerity 1s to pay off.
Is there a case for more policy dialogue?
Of course, 1f 1t really 1s dialogue. Both donors and African states 
have made mistakes, need to reassess and to revise their programmes, and are 
(or ought to be) unsure what really will work now. There 1s an urgent need to 
get away from casting blame, making rhetorical generalisations, and trying to 
compress very complex and specific problems Into one sentence slogans.
Serious policy dialogues aimed at seeing 1n specific contexts what the criti­
cal problems are, what has been successfully or unsuccessfully prescribed and 
attempted 1n the past, and what actions should and can be undertaken now,
could be very useful.
Preaching and Imposing programmes (which 1s what most sub-Saharan
African governments currently think Invitations to dialogue actually mean) 
will not be useful. First, many of the actions now criticised were advocated 
and financed by some of today's most confident critics (for example, 1n the 
early 1970s' grain price reductions, emphasis on mechanised agriculture, over­
investment 1n large factories, International airports, etc). Second, general­
ised prescriptions from a long distance rarely correspond well to specific
realities. Third, Imposed programmes may well be accepted but usually only 
after an economy 1s 1n a state of nearly complete collapse and with a limited 
commitment to working steadfastly for their Implementation. Such conditions 
do not augur well for the success of even the most soundly conceived pro­
grammes .
Because the situation 1n most sub-Saharan economies 1s very serious,
because past results suggest serious errors 1n donor and recipient policies 
and analysis, because the present context requires policy changes, because 
specific programmes must relate to actual national contexts (not generalisa­
tions Intended to apply to 30 countries), and because difficult policies re­
quire genuine national understanding and backing 1f they are to work
-- dialogue 1s critical. But 1t needs to be clear that what is Intended 
really is dialogue, 1n which donors acknowledge that they too need to learn
more 1n order to formulate sensible programmes for their own actions. Only on
that basis 1s any contribution to the design of rehabilitation and recovery
programmes for sub-Saharan countries likely to prove successful.
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make price corrections compatible with political stability, but even to allow 
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peasants, wage earners, c1v11 servants and managers alike) and the capacity to 
provide minimum critical services (e.g. power, water, education, health, agri­
cultural extension).
What austerity by Itself has not been able to achieve 1s the freeing of
sufficient resources either to restore external balance or to end recurrent
budget deficits. In many countries there 1s an acute danger that further cuts 
will merely have the effect of diminishing exports and government revenue and 
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revenue and exports begin to recover —  1s critical. But 1t will only work 1f 
more foreign exchange to restore production and government revenue 1s also 
available. In some cases this may largely require altering the balance of ex­
ternal financial flows toward maintenance, rehabilitation and operating In­
puts. In others -- as with the rehabilitation programmes of major commercial 
enterprises -- more external grants and credits will be required 1f the 
austerity 1s to pay off.
Is there a case for more policy dialogue?
Of course, 1f 1t really 1s dialogue. Both donors and African states 
have made mistakes, need to reassess and to revise their programmes, and are 
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Serious policy dialogues aimed at seeing 1n specific contexts what the criti­
cal problems are, what has been successfully or unsuccessfully prescribed and 
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Preaching and Imposing programmes (which 1s what most sub-Saharan 
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investment 1n large factories, International airports, etc). Second, general­
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realities. Third, Imposed programmes may well be accepted but usually only 
after an economy 1s 1n a state of nearly complete collapse and with a limited 
commitment to working steadfastly for their Implementation. Such conditions 
do not augur well for the success of even the most soundly conceived pro­
grammes .
Because the situation 1n most sub-Saharan economies 1s very serious,
because past results suggest serious errors 1n donor and recipient policies
and analysis, because the present context requires policy changes, because 
specific programmes must relate to actual national contexts (not generalisa­
tions Intended to apply to 30 countries), and because difficult policies re­
quire genuine national understanding and backing 1f they are to work
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